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VOLUME XXI NOVEMBER, 1946 NUMBER 4
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WASHINGTON
OLD AGE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
VERN COUNTRYMAN
More than 60,000 persons over 65 years of age in the State of Wash-
ington now receive old age assistance totaling in excess of $3,500,000
per month ' With the progressive advancement of life expectancy and
the decline of employment opportunities for the aged in the postwar
years, these figures can be expected to increase until by 1950 more than
75,000 aged persons in this state will receive assistance which, under
present standards, will approximate $5,000,000 per month I Administra-
tion of this huge program of public assistance has been carried out
under laws which are models of benevolent purpose and obscure meaning
In an earlier article3 the writer discussed the history of old age assist-
ance in this state prior to the enactment in 1940 of Initiative 141, 4
the changes effected by the initiative measure and the problems arising
out of conflict between the provisions of the initiative and those of the
Federal Social Security Act, under which matching funds up to $20
per recipient were secured from the federal treasury To recapitulate
briefly, Initiative 141 provided for old age assistance grants of "not
less than $40 per month minus income from other sources"
to persons 65 years of age who met certain residence requirements and
were "without resources" But the Federal Social Security Board had
ruled that section 3(g)5 and 3(h) 6 of the initiative, which defined
"income" and "resources" to exclude certain material items, were in
'For the period October, 1942, through September, 1944, the average
monthly expenditure for old age assistance was $2,213,416 in cash grants
and $322,874 for medical and institutional care State Dept of Social
Security, Biennial Report (1942-1944) pp 59-60 Since that time, the aver-
age cash grant has increased from $38 to $55 per month2 Ibid pp 43-45
Countryman, Old Age Assistance in Washington (1941) 16 WASH L
REV 95
'Rm REv. STAT. (1941 supp ) § 9998-34 et seq
5 Ibid. § 9998-36 (g): "'Income' shall mean regular or recurrent gains in
cash or kind, excepting therefrom:
(1) the value of the use or occupancy of the premises in which the
applicant resides
(2) Foodstuffs, livestock, fuel, light or water produced by or donated to
applicant or applicant's family exclusively for the use of applicant
or applicant's family
(3) Casual gifts in cash which do not exceed $100 in any one year
(4) Casual gifts in kind which do not exceed $100 in any one year
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conflict with the requirement of the federal act 7 that "other income
and resources" of an applicant should be considered "in determining
need" and that Section 9,8 which provided for judicial review of ad-
ministrative action and authorized the court to receive "additional
evidence" and to "fix the amount of assistance" was inconsistent with
the provision in the federal act9 that the state plan should provide for
administration by a single state agency 10 Thereafter, the State Depart-
ment of Social Security drew up a revised plan which disregarded
sections 3 (g) and 3 (h) and limited the function of the court on appeal
to a review of the record to determine whether the department had
acted within its powers, had employed an honest judgment, and had
acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously This plan was approved
by the federal board" and was put into effect May 1, 1941 12
ELIGIBILITY; AMOUNT AND NATURE OF ASSISTANCE
The legal problems arising out of this administrative construction
of an initiative measure to meet federal requirements"3 came before
the state supreme court in Morgan v Dept of Social-Security 14 There
it was held that, in view of the declaration of intent "to provide for
Washington' Senior Citizens over 65 as liberally as possible under the
terms of the Federal Social Security Act for securing matching funds"
(5) The proceeds from the sale of property which is not a resource
provided such proceeds are used for the purchase of property
which is not a resource"
6 Ibid § 9998-36(h): "'Resources' shall mean any property which the
applicant owns legally or beneficially excepting therefrom:
(1) The ability of relatives or friends of the applicant to contribute to
the support of the applicant
(2) Insurance policies, the cash surrender value of which does not
exceed $500
(3) The homestead, home or place of residence of applicant or the
spouse of applicant
(4) Intangible property or personal property, the cash value of which
does not exceed $200
(5) The personal effects of the applicant, including clothing furniture
household equipment and motor vehicle
(6) Foodstuffs livestock, fuel light or water produced by the applicant,
applicant's spouse or family, exclusively for the use of applicant
or applicant's family"
7 42U S C A § 302
8 REM REV STAT (1941 supp) § 9998-42 " The applicant and the
director shall have the right to present any additional evidence which the
court shall deem competent, relevant or material to the case The Superior
Court shall decide the case on the record and on any evidence introduced
before it The court may affirm, modify or reverse the decision of the direc-
tor and shall fix the amount of assistance to which the applicant shall be
entitled under this act "
9 Supra note 7
10 Minutes of Meeting of Social Security Board, Washington D C
November 15 1940
11 Document No 6164, Order of Social Security Board, January 28 1941
12 State Dept of Social Security, Staff Memorandum No 104, January
30, 1941
13 See Countryman, supra note 3, pp 98-99, 104
14 14 Wn (2d) 156, 127 P (2d) 686 (1942)
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contained in Section 2 of the initiative' 5 and the provision in Section 12
thereof I that if 'any portion, section or clause of this act shall for
any reason be declared not in accordance with the provisions of
the Federal Social Security Act, such adjudication shall not affect the
remainder of the act," the department, in refusing to give effect to
Sections 3(g) and 3(h), had "merely followed the directions contained
in Initiative 141 itself, by disregarding certain provisions of the act,
so as to bring the act in harmony with the federal statute" To the
contention that the initiative, as construed, constituted an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power to the executive branch, the
court replied that no more had been done than to authorize the execu-
tive to suspend the operation of certain sections of the act upon deter-
mination of a given fact or status, and that such a delegation was
dearly valid 17 That a state constitutional question might have arisen
had the initiative not been construed to fit the requirements of the
federal act was indicated by the further holding that, inasmuch as the
initiative as construed extended benefits only to persons in actual need,
it did not violate, prohibitions in the state constitution against special
privileges '8
The court also upheld the department's system of "budgetary guides"
used in fixing the amount of assistance to be given eligible senior citi-
zens By these guides, the department had taken the $40 grant provided
for by Section 5 of the initiative as "the maximum allowance" and had
divided it into fixed amounts for food, fuel, housing, light, water, cloth-
25 REmv. REv. STAT (1941 supp) § 9998-35
16 Ibid § 9998-54.
7 "Appellants did not raise the question of delegation of state legislative
or judicial power to a federal administrative agency Their only contentioh
with respect to the action of the federal board was that there had been
no "adjudication" of inconsistency with the federal act within the meaning
of § 21 of the initiative The theory of the court's disposition of this point
is not clear It was said that "Whether or not the action of the federal
board was definitely an administrative adjudication of the matter is
immaterial" But the court went on to provide an "adjudication" of its
own: "We now hold that § 3, subparagraphs (g) and (h), of Initiative
141, are not in accord with the provisions of the Federal Social Security
Act, and that the federal board correctly held that these subparagraphs
'are in violation' of that act" Cf dissenting opinion of Simpson, J: "The
majority's approval of the department's actions constitutes a transfer of
the power vested in the judicial branch in that it allows a federal admin-
istrative agency to construe a law of this state" The statement in Note
(1943) 18 WASH L REv. 42, that the majority opinion answered this objec-
tion by holding, inter alia, "that the federal agency in its definition of terms
had not usurped the power vested by the Constitution in the judicial
branch of the government" attributes to the Morgan decision a ruling on a
phase of the problem which the majority expressly declined to consider:
"Within the four corners of these cases, we find no question properly before
us for determination, which concerns the department's negotiations or
administrative relations with the federal department or any federal
authority"
18 WAsE. CoNsr Art I § 12: "No law shall be passed granting to
any citizen privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms,
shall not equally belong to all citizens
1946]
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ing, incidentals and household replacements A separate determination
was made for the sharing of household expenses through "combined
living" of applicants 19 For each of such items available to the appli-
cant at no cost the allocated amount was deducted from $40 to fix the
amount of the award 20 Applicants in the Morgan case objected that this
system disregarded the directive in Section 5 of the act that grants
should be awarded "to each eligible applicant2  in the sum of
not less than $40 per month, minus income from other sources," 2
but the court, without expressly considering this statutory language,
held that use of the budgetary system was a permissible exercise of
administrative discretion,2 3 indicating that if such factors were not
taken into consideration so as to insure equality in the fixing of grants,
constitutional questions might arise
The net effect, then, of administrative and judicial interpretation of
Initiative 141 with respect to eligibility for and the amount of assist-
ance is this: Where the initiative provided that each senior citizen
"without resources" who has an income of less than $40 per month (and
defined "income" and "resources" to exclude such items as housing,
food, fuel, light and water) should receive an award of not less than
$40 per month, minus income from other sources, $40 was actually
taken as the maximum award in any case, subject to reduction for
such available items as housing, food, fuel, light and water
While this seems clearly to be the effect given to the initiative, the
exact status of Sections 3(g) and 3(h) thereof after the Morgan deci-
sion is not so clear In upholding the department's system of budgetary
guides, the court placed some reliance on a provision in Section 17 of
the general Public Assistance Act of 193921 that:
"Such [federal-aid] assistance may be granted only to such
persons as are in need A person shall be considered to be in
WASH CONST Art VIII § 5: The credit of the state shall not in any
manner, be given or loaned to or in aid of any individual19 Staff Memorandum No 104 supra note 12
20 Where such items were secured by the applicant at some cost to him-
self (including in the case of home ownership, the cost of taxes, insurance,
etc), the administrative difficulty involved in attempting to compare this
cost with the purchase price or rental othei applicants must pay was
thought to be so great as to preclude any attempt to make appropriate
deductions from the amount of the award
21 By § 4 of the initiative persons over 65 years of age were eligible
if they were 'without resources" and had 'a yearly income which is less
than $480 and a monthly income which is less than $40" REm REv STAT
(1941 supp) § 9998-37
22 Undel the piesent act $40 a month for those without income or
resources is the floor, the minimum grant-the actual needs by [sic] appli-
cants may be satisfied only by a grant in excess of $40 or by a combination
of grant and private resources The $40 basic need grant of Initiative
141 is a minimum grant But the department treats it as a maximum grant"
Appellant's Brief, Supreme Court Docket Nos 28626 28627 at pp 32, 61
23 Accord: Burgdorf v Dept of Social Security 14 Wn (2d) 209 108
P (2d) 709 (1942); Halsell v Dept of Social Security, 14 Wn (2d) 709 (1942)
21 REm Rav STAT (1939 supp ) § 10007-117a
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need within the meaning of this act who does not have re-
sources sufficient to provide himself and dependents with food,
clothing, shelter and such other items as are necessary to
afford a reasonable subsistence"
Resort to this statute is perfectly consistent with a holding that
Sections 3(g) and 3 (h) are inoperative, hence would not operate to
repeal prior inconsistent legislation, and would seem to settle the ques-
tion previously raised 25 as to the status of the further provision of
Section 17 of the 1939 act that:
"'Resources' are hereby aefined to include ability of
relatives within the classes hereinafter described (husband,
wife, parent, child, brother and sister) to contribute to such
support: Provided, That where such relative or relatives shall
refuse to so contribute the administrator may in his discretion
and upon written findings of fact filed by him, determine that
ability of a relative or relatives to so contribute shall not
constitute a resource sufficient to render the applicant ineli-
gible to assistance "
But when the question of a wife's ability to contribute to the sup-
port of an applicant by virtue of her ownership of separate property
came before the court,2 8 no reference was made to the above-quoted
statute Instead, it was said that:
"Initiative 141 controls this case The act itself
defines resources Section 3(h) reads: 'Resources shall
mean any property which the applicant owns legally or bene-
ficially, excepting therefrom: (1) The ability of relatives or
friends of the applicant to contribute to the support of the
applicant' (The: e are fiveother enumerated exceptions which
are not material here )
"Under the quoted provisions of the initiative, respondent
is without resources unless he can be said to own, legally or
beneficially, some portion or share of, or interest in, his wife's
separate property"
The court then concluded that, inasmuch as the husband had no
legal or beneficial interest in the property, the department erred in
refusing to allow his application for assistance 27
Within the next year the court reviewed another case wherein the
department had ruled that a contract for sale of real property, on
which eleven yearly payments of $100 each remained due and which
had a present cash value of $800, constituted a present resource of
$800 which rendered the applicant ineligible for assistance 28 The
: Countryman, supra note 3, p 104
" Cbristiansen v Dept of Social Security, 15 Wn (2d) 465, 131 P (2d)
189 (1942)
27"A husband's separate property is regarded as available for the sup-
port of his legal dependents including the spouse since the law requires
him to support her and provides a means by which she can secure such
support" S ate Dept of Social Security, Staff Memorandum No 46-47,
May 22, 1946, par. II (A)
28 Cerenzia v Dept of Social Security, 18 Wn (2d) 230, 138 P (2d) 868(1943)
1946]
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opinion of the court quotes Section 3 (g) and 3(h) in full, notes that
the Morgan decision had found these sections not in accord with the
federal act, quotes the department's rule that "all income and resources
without substantial exception, shall be taken into consideration both
in determining eligibility and in fixing the amount of the grant," and
without any reference to the 1939 act concludes:
"We are satisfied that the department was authorized to
classify the contract as a resource, either under the rule promul-
gated by the department, or under the statutory definition of
resources, or under the definition given in Webster's New
International Dictionary
What, then, is the present effect of the statutory definitions of "in-
come" and "resources" contained in Sections 3(g) and 3(h) of Ini-
tiative 141 and of the previous definition of "resources" contained in
Section 17 of the 1939 act? One plausible explanation, consistent with
the holdings if not with the language of the above-cited cases, can be
offered: Some of the exceptions contained in Section 3(g) and 3(h)-
at least the one pertaining to ability of relatives to contribute to the
support of the applicant-are not inconsistent with the federal act and
will be given effect; 29 only insofar as the provisions of Section 17 of
the 1939 act are in conflict with these effective portions of Sections
3 (g) and 3(h) are they repealed But if this is the meaning of the
decisions, it would be as easy as it is desirable for the court in express
terms to say so 10
Additional confusion on this point was created by the action of the
1945 legislature That body amended two of the exceptions to the
definition of income contained in Section 3 (g) 31 and, in so doing, re-
enacted Section 3 (g) and 3 (h) in their entirety 12 It may be argued
that this is indicative of no particular legislative intent, but is merely
an unconsidered formal compliance with the requirement of Article II,
Section 37, Washington Constitution, that "the section amended shall
be set forth at full length " On the other hand, re-enactment of these
provisions might be construed as a legislative adoption of the view of
the dissenting judges in the Morgan case that the people intended
29 This seems to be the interpretation adopted by the department See
Biennial Report supra note 1, p 49: "The department is fully satisfied
with both the principle and the application of [Initiative 141] in removing
relative responsibility for the aged '
SO Compare similarly indecisive treatment by the court of a statute
once held unconstitutional, discussed in Jaffe, Status of Picketing in Wash-
ington (1940) 15 WAsH L REV 47
3, Subdivisions (3) and (4) of § 3(g), quoted in note 5, supra, were
amended and consolidated into one subdivision reading: "Gifts in cash or
kind of a casual and non-recurring nature which do not materially affect
the Senior Citizen s income"
31 R~m R-v STAT (1945 supp) § 9998-36 Add to this legislative action
the fact that representatives of the federal board met with the legislative
committee and helped draft the 1945 amendment, and the confusion en-
gendered by the amendment is compounded
[VOL 21
OLD AGE ASSISTANCE
Initiative 141 to apply in its full terms regardless of the action of the
federal board and the availability of federal matching funds The
Attorney General has adopted a still different view and advised the
department that, inasmuch as the declaration of intent in Section 2
to go as far as possible under the terms of the federal act was not
amended, that "dominant expressed intent" must still be given effect
and "such conflicting parts are again rendered inoperative "33
Meanwhile, the 1943 legislature adopted a new approach in an
attempt to increase the amount of assistance which could be awarded
consistent with federal matching-fund requirements The basis of eligi-
bility for awards was amended to make eligible not only the 65-year-old
without resources who had a yearly income of less than $480 and a
monthly income of less than $40, but also one who had "income in-
sufficient to meet his or her needs -'4 And to the section of the initia-
tive prescribing grants of "not less than $40 per month minus income"
(and resources, in the 1943 amendment) was added the proviso:
"That in the event an applicant's needs are in excess of $40
per month, in determining the amount of his or her grant, any
income or resource which applicant may have shall be utilized
as a credit against his or her total monthly need; but no grant
as so computed shall exceed such sum of $40 per month ,,35
This amendment merely provided by indirection for a result pre-
scribed directly in Initiative 141 Under its provisions, if an applicant
had, say, $20 in income or resources which the initiative had said
should be disregarded in awarding a $40 grant, but which the federal
board and state supreme court had held must be considered in fixing
the amount of the award, the department could now find that the
needs of the applicant were such that a $60 income was required and,
applying the applicant's $20 from other sources against his total needs
rather than against the amount of his grant, could still award him the
full $40 Since it was a rare case in which the needs of an applicant,
by any humane standard, did not exceed $40 per month, 6 the effect
of the 1943 amendment was to accomplish substantially the same result
as would have been achieved by giving full effect to those provisions
of Initiative 141 which were disapproved by the federal board and
state court 37 Of course, in that rare case where an applicant's need
did not exceed $40 per month, income and resources were still de-
U ADVANCE OPs ATT'Y GEN (1945-1946) p 439
"REm REv. STAT. (1943 supp) § 9998-37
":Ibid § 9998-38
U Witness the department's Biennial Report, supra note 1, at p 48:
"[Nleeds of an aged individual's living alone with all common expenses and
with nothing provided to him without cost from any other source, fall
somewhere between $43 and $75 per month, or for man and wife, some-
where between $65 and $100."
'7T bid: "As a result of the 1943 change, average grants throughout the
state increased from slightly less than $34 per month to almost $38 per
month with more than % of all recipients receiving $40"
1946]
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ductible from the $40 award under the 1943 act, and in that respect
the result differed from that provided for by Initiative 141 This dif-
ference proved enough to satisfy the federal board and it approved the
department's plan embodying the provisions of the 1943 amendment 38
After a period of operation under this plan, the department reported
that, inasmuch as the 1943 amendment "did not permit the department
to pay grants in amounts larger than $40," but did permit payment
of the full $40 to persons with other income and resources, recipients
without other income and resources were "placed at a disadvantage
under the law "I' This interpretation of the statute seems extremely
dubious,40 but in 1945 the legislature nonetheless acted to remedy the
situation reported by the department and to increase the general level
of awards in all cases The provision in the 1943 amendment for awards
of $40 minus income and resources unless the department could find
needs in excess of $40 from which income and resources could be de-
ducted was replaced in its entirety by a provision for awards:
"To each eligible Senior Citizen sixty-five years of age or
over for the purpose of assisting him to meet his needs: Pro-
vided, That such grant when added to his income shall equal
not less than $50 per month "41
The 1945 statute also expressly authorized the use by the department
of budgetary guides4 2 "to determine a Senior Citizen's need," thus
confirming what had been established administrative practice since
1935 43
A plan based on the 1945 act, removing the maximum payment
limitation entirely, was submitted to the federal board and was put
11 Conversation with J M Wedemeyer, Supt of Public Assistance, State
Dept of Social Security
"Biennial Report, supra note 1, p 48
"0 The 1943 amendment did not change the language of Initiative 141
providing for grants of "not less than $40 per month' It was only within
the proviso authorizing deduction of income and resources from total needs
rather than from the amount of the award in cases where total needs were
found to be in excess of $40 that the statute provided that "no grant as
so computed shall exceed such sum of $40 per month" But even prior to
the 1943 amendment, the department seems to have construed the phrase
not less than $40' to mean "not more than $40' See discussion of the
system of budgetary guides, supra pp 191-192
11REm REV STAT (1945 supp) § 9998-38 The elig bility requirement
was also amended to make eligible a 65-year-old without resources who
"has a yearly income which is less than $600 and a monthly income which
is less than $50 or has income insufficient to meet his or her needs" Ibid
§ 9998-37
12The general Public Assistance Act of 1939 had provided that the
amount of assistance to be granted on any federal-aid p-ogram should be
determined in each individual case on a "budgetary basis' REm Rsv STAT(1939 supp ) § 10007-117a and had defined "budgetary basis" to mean "a
basis taking into consideration an applicant's need and resources
measured in relation to a basic minimum family budget determined by the
department" Ibid § 10007-101a
' Prior to 1941, the guides had been used to measure the applicant's
total need Under Initiative 141 they were used only to measure the amount
to be deducted from the $40 award for available income and resources
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into effect in March, 1945, pending federal approval Before that
approval could be secured, however, the superior court for Walla Walla
County construed the statute to mean that a husband and wife living
together without other income or resources were entitled to minimum
cash awards of $50 each, with no deduction for savings secured through
"combined living ,14 Inquiry to the Social Security Board revealed
that it found no inconsistency between this result and federal require-
ments,45 and a revised plan which took no account of "combined living"
was accordingly prepared and submitted for approval 48 The board
then discovered, apparently for the first time, that the new plan, like
those approved in 1941 and 1943, took no account of income and re-
sources secured by an applicant at "some cost" to himself,47 and re-
jected it on that ground 48 The plan was thereupon revised to provide
that the net value of income and/or resources available to the applicant
(i e, gross value, as determined by budgetary guides, less cost to the
applicant) should be deducted in fixing the amount of the grant,49 and
as revised was approved by the board " The average cash grant paid
under this plan is now $55 and it is anticipated that, with the con-
tinuing rise of price levels, that average will reach $60 by 1950
While this extensive revision of methods and measurements was
being unde:taken with respect to the amount of the cash award to
But, since the enactment of the 1943 amendment giving the department
greater latitude in measuring and attempting to meet actual needs of
applicants, the guides have again been used to measure total need J M
Wedemeyer, supra note 38 By another 1945 enactment, the budgetary
guides used to determine need for purpo-es of old age assistance are also
required to be used to determine the need of applicants for all types of
public assistance REm REv STAT (1945 supp) § 10007-301
"Myers v Dept of Social Security, Docket No 32223
Letter from Oscar M Powell, Executive Director, Federal Social
Security Board, dated October 23, 1945.
"State Dept. of Social Security, Staff Memorandum No 46-36, April
10, 1946 With reference to the disregard of "combined living," compare the
provision made in the 1945 Act for the use of budgetary guides: "In order
to determine a Senior Citizen's need the Department shall establish objec-
tive budgetary guides based upon actual living cost studies Such
living cost studies shall be renewed or revised at least once a year; and
whenever there is a change of five per cent (5%) or more in the cost of any
of the items of the budget common to any category of Senior Citizens such
change shall be reflected in the determinatioh of his need. For the purposes
of this section the term 'category' shall mean such distinction as prevails
between single Senior Citizens living alone, husbands and wives living
together, and any other sizable group of Senior Citizens who can by deter-
mination of the Department be placed in separate categories Provided,
That Senior Citizens found to be without any resources and income shall
receive a grant of not less than $50 per month " REm REv STAT (1945
supp) § 9998-38. (Italics supplied)
,7 See discussion, supra note 20
"Letter from Oscar M. Powell, supra note 45, dated May 10, 1946
,1 Staff Memorandum No 46-47, supra note 27 "No deduction is
made, however, if the value is found to be inconsequential, or when the
value represents only a saving achieved through the management of the
assistance payment" Ibid par III (B) (1)
"
0 Letter from Oscar M Powell, supra note 45, dated June 28, 1946
1946]
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be paid to recipients,5 the provisions of Initiative 141 for other types
of assistance received little attention The section providing for medical,
dental, surgical, optical, hospital and nursing care "by a doctor of
recipient's own choosing" 52 has been construed to include the services
of a licensed sanipractor 13 The further provision in that section for
artificial limbs, eyes, hearing aids and other appliances remains un-
changed Section 13, providing that "Upon the death of any recipient
under this act, funeral expenses in the sum of $100 shall be paid by
the department," has been held unconstitutional as applied to a deceased
recipient whose estate is sufficient to defray the costs of the funeral
over and above the expenses of last sickness and of administration 64
The 1945 legislature included in the section authorizing awards meas-
ured by the need of the applicant the specific provision that "To each
Senior Citizen residing in a county hospital the department shall award
a grant to meet his needs of a personal and incidental character" The
board advised that no federal funds would be forthcoming to match such
payments with respect to recipients committed for other than temporary
care,' 5 but the department is nonetheless making payments of from
$5 to $8 per month to eligible applicants residing in the county hos-
pitals "I
ADmINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE
Previous reference has been made in this review 7 to the confusion
engendered by the overlapping of the administrative provisions of In-
itiative 141, which applies only to old age assistance, and those of the
general Public Assistance Act,' 8 which by its terms applies to all forms
12 One change made in federal standards was never incorporated into
the Washington plan By joint resolution enacted in 1943 (57 Stat 72 125)
and reenacted in 1944 (58 Stat 15), the states were authorized, during the
period of the war emergency, to disregard "any income and resources of
[an old age assistance recipient] arising from agricultural labor performed
by him as an employee, or from labor otherwise performed by him in
connection with the raising or harvesting of agricultural commodities" if
such action did not result in payment of assistance "at a rate in excess
of the rate for old-age assistance paid during the month of July, 19435 2 REM REV STAT (1941 supp) § 9998-48
13 Martin v Dept of Social Security, 12 Wn. (2d) 328, 121 P (2d) 394
(1942)
"State v Guaranty Trust Co, 20 Wn (2d) 588, 148 P (2d) 323 (1944)
6 Letter from Oscar M Powell, supra note 45, dated June 26, 1945
Although the federal act does not require the state plan to exclude assist-
ance to applicants in public institutions as a condition to receiving any
federal assistance for the state program, 42 U S C A. § 302, it provides
for federal matching funds only with respect to assistance rendered "to
each needy individual who at the time of such expenditure is sixty-five
years of age or older and is not an inmate of a public institution." 42 U S
C A § 303, as amended by Public Law No 719, 79th Cong, 2d Sess, infra
note 79
16 J M Wedemeyer, supra note 38
57Sholley Social Security (1941) 16 WAsH. L REV 78; Countryman,
supra note 3, p 103
58.REM REV STAT (1939 supp) § 10007-10a et seq, as amended by
Wash Laws 1941, c 128, and Wash Laws 1943, c 172
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of public assistance. By a 1945 enactment, the legislature has directed
that applicants for all types of public assistance "shall be entitled to a
fair hearing under the terms and conditions established for fair hearings
for Senior Citizens under Sections 7, 8 and 9" of Initiative 141,r 9
but the corresponding sections of the general act were neither amended
nor repealed so that the duplicitous coverage remains The department,
however, has attempted by its rules and regulations 0 to effect a maxi-
mum of correlation between the two acts
Where Section 7 of the initiative measure provides that applications
for old age assistance shall be made to, investigated by, and ruled upon
by the department "or an authorized agency of the department,0 ' the
rules adopt the county welfare department, which the general statute
establishes to handle local administration of all public assistance," as
the authorized agency of the department 63 Where the general statute
provides for appeal from the county welfare department's decision to the
Department of Social Security "in the manner prescribed by the depart-
ment," the rules adopt the procedur4 contained in Section 8 of the
initiative 5 for a hearing before the director of the department, or the
acting supervisor thereof, or an examiner appointed by the director 6
The initiative measure provides that it is the duty of the department,
upon receipt of notice of appeal, "to set a date for the fair hearing, such
date to be not more than thirty days after receipt of notice," and it is
now established by the decision in Bowen v Dept of Social Security 7
that if the department fails to grant the hearing within the thirty-day
period, the applicant may take his appeal directly to the superior court
The rules of the department, however, do not cover the matter of
judicial review, and in this respect the inconsistency between the two
acts remain But perhaps because of uncertainty as to the applicability
of the provisions for appeal to the superior court by certiorari contained
in the 1941 amendment to the general statute, 8 or, in the earlier cases,
because of the more favorable procedure provided by the initiative,69
:1 PRmw REv STAT. (1945 supp ) § 10007-3020 State Dept of Social Security, Rules and Regulations Relating to the
Administration of Old Age Assistance, September 28, 1946
:
1 R2m REV STAT (1941 supp) § 9998-40
2Ibid § 10007-104a
:3 Supra note 60, Rules 17-23
'REm REv. STAT (1941 supp) § 10007-117b
"Ibid § 9998-41
"Supra note 60, Rules 43-47
6714 Wn (2d) 148, 127 P (2d) 682 (1942)
*
8Wash. Constitution, Amend VII, provides that: "No act, law or bill
approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon shall be amended
or repealed by the legislature within a period of two years following such
enactment." Initiative 141 became effective December 5 1940 Hence, the
only possible effect of the procedure set up by the 1941 general statute
would be to provide an alternative method of appeal
Go See Sholley, supra note 57 p. 81. As to the scope of judicial review
on certiorari, see Larson, Administrative Determinations and the Extraor-
dinary Writs in the State of Washington (1945) 20 WAsH. L.- REv 22, 29-36
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all appeals thus far taken by applicants for old age assistance have been
under the provisions of Section 9 of the initiative 70
To the extent that this practice was influenced by the opportunity
given appellants by Section 9 to introduce "additional evidence" and
to persuade the court to "fix the amount of assistance," the reason for
taking appeals under Section 9 was considerably diminished by the su-
preme court's treatment of that section in the Morgan case 7 ' Although
the federal board had ruled that these features of the section were incon-
sistent with the federal requirement that the assistance plan be admin-
istered by a single state agency, the court did not deal with the problem
on the basis of federal requirements Rather, in rejecting a contention
that Section 9 was invalid as an unconstitutional transfer of executive
power to the judiciary, the court said:
"We find nothing in Section 9 which purports to invest the
courts with executive functions The section does no more than
provide for review by the courts upon questions of fact and
law, which have been determined by the department If the
courts should attempt to exercise executive functions in con-
nection with the administration of the statute, the courts would
be undertaking to transcend the powers vested by the statute
Under the act, it is the duty of the judicial department to re-
view departmental orders from which appeals have been taken
in accordance with the statute, and determine by the applica-
tion of appropriate legal principles whether or not the plans,
standards, or methods adopted by the department violate .some
statutory provision because directly contrary thereto, or are
in some measure inadequate or unlawful, in that they exceed or
restrict the departmental action contemplated by the statute
Such review by the courts does not constitute the exercise of
any executive function To determine whether or not an appel-
lant has been deprived of a statutory right by the department,
whether the department has acted by way of the adoption of a
general plan or by some decision in a specific case, constitutes
a proper matter for judicial review
Although this language is not addressed specifically to the terms of
Section 9 upon which the federal board based its objection, those same
terms constituted the basis for the objection on constitutional grounds
which the court did consider," and a construction of the section which
avoids the latter objection would appear also to avoid the former
'10 RErm REV STAT (1941 supp) § 9998-42
71 Supra note 14
72 It was argued by the Attorney General, for the department that "An
interpretation of § 9 which would permit the unlimited introduction of new
evidence offered on the merits of any claim and a de novo determination of
the claim by the court would be of doubtful constitutionality as an uncon-
stitutional delegation of administrative power to the courts" and that the
court should therefore construe the section to mean "that the court has
only a right of review of the action taken by the director and is authorized
only to inquire in the individual cases whether the administrative deter-
mination is wholly without evidentiary support or wholly dependent upon
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That the court did construe Section 9 to eliminate anything which it
considered a delegation of executive power to the judiciary is obvious
from its holding, but just what that construction was is far from explicit
in the opinion Apparently, the courts may not hear "additional evi-
dence" (their function is to "review questions of fact and law,
which have been determined by the department"), nor "fix the amount
of assistance" (they are to determine the legality of "plans, standards, or
methods adopted by the department") 73 But if that is the meaning of
the decision, it amounts to more than statutory construction It con-
stitutes a holding that those provisions of the statute which expressly
authorize the courts to hear additional evidence and to fix the amount
of the award cannot, because of constitutitonal requirements, be given
effect-in other words, those provisions are unconstitutional Here
again, an express holding to that effect seems eminently preferable to
the obtuse rhetoric employed by the court to dispose of the constitu-
tional objection For it is the function of a court of last resort not only
to dispose of the case before it, but also to determine and to enunciate
the legal principles which govern that disposition 74 Clarity in the
enunciation of those principles is particularly essential "in our judicial
system, where opinions have the function not only to decide cases be-
tween litigants but also to furnish a guide for the future action of all
citizens ,711 The citizenry, and particularly future litigants and trial
judges, will have considerable difficulty with the "guide" furnished them
in the Morgan decision
Subject, therefore, to considerable uncertainty as to the effect of that
decision, the procedure by which the state program of old age assistance
operates can be described as follows: Original applications for assistance
are made to the county welfare department That agency considers,
investigates and rules upon the application An applicant "feeling him-
self aggrieved" by such ruling may, within 60 days after receiving notice
of the ruling, file with the director of the Department of Social Security
a question of law, or clearly arbitrary or capricious" Appellant's Brief,
Supreme Court Docket No. 28637 pp 53-54, 68
73 The Attorney General seems to have come to about the same conclu-
sion He has advised the Department that the Morgan decision "settled the
de novo features in appeals to the courts" ADVANCE Ops ATT'Y GEN, supra
note 33, p 437 Prior to receipt of this advice, the Department seems to
have entertained a somewhat different notion as to the status of § 9 In its
biennial report to the governor for 1942-1944, supra note 1, at p 9, it
recommended extension of the appeal provisions of the general Public
Assistance Act "to cover Old Age Assistance, or amendment of certain
portions of § 9 [of Initiative 141] At present the latter section is in con-
flict with the Social Security Act and inoperative as far as the federal plan
Is concerned Thus in OAA there is no operative statute governing appeals
to courts"
71 That function is expressly imposed upon our supreme court by WAsT.
CoNST Art IV, § 2: "In the determination of causes, all decisions of the
court shall be given in writing, and the grounds of the decision shall be
stated"
75 Hyde, Appellate Court Decisions (1942) 28 A. B A. JouR. 808, 812
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a notice of appeal Within 30 days after receipt of such notice, the
department must grant the applicant a hearing and upon its failure to
do so the applicant may appeal directly to the superior court The
department will base its decision "wholly upon evidence introduced in
the hearing" by the applicant and the county administrator" and must
within 30 days after hearing notify the applicant of the decision, failure
to give such notice constituting an affirmation of the decision of the
county welfare department If the applicant again "feels himself ag-
grieved" by the decision of the department, he may within 60 days after
such decision appeal to the superior court On such appeal the court,
apparently, is limited to a review of the record made at the hearing, and
may consider only whether the department's determinations on questions
of fact are supported by such record and whether the department has
correctly followed and applied the applicable legal principles From the
decision of the superior court, either party may take an appeal to the
supreme court in the manner provided by law for civil appeals
The current Washington plan for old age assistance represents the
most realistic approach yet taken in the measurement of cash awards to
be made to the needy aged Initiative 141 was construed to fix a $40-
minus-income-and-resources maximum and the award could be made to
provide for the recipient's actual needs only to the extent that they did
not exceed that limit Under that plan, while an applicant became eli-
gible for assistance on the basis of his need, the amount of assistance
awarded was seldom adequate to meet that need The 1943 amendment
was interpreted only to provide a means of disregarding income and
resources within the $40 maximum and thus to allow the department
fully to meet the needs of a comparatively few additional persons whose
requirements actually did not exceed $40 plus their available income
and resources But, under the 1945 statute and plan, the maximum
amount of the award is to be measured by the actual needs of each
recipient as determined by the department,77 and the assistance re-
"e Rules and Regulations, supra note 60, Rule 46. Whether or not the
court may hear additional evidence, or must confine its review to the
record prepared by the county administrator, in cases where the appeal
is taken directly from the county welfare department to the superior court
because of the state department's failure to grant a hearing within 30 days
after application therefor, was not decided in the Bowen case After the
appeal to the court had been taken in that case, the director held a hearing
and granted the applicant's contentions in full, and the court thereafter
dismissed the appeal as moot The federal requirement that the state plan
be administered by a single agency would operate here also to prevent
the taking of additional evidence by the court, and if the Morgan decision
means that state constitutional requirements forbid such procedure on
review of a state department decision the same limitation would apply
to judicial review of a county department decision
77 The needs of the recipient include those of his dependent spouse, not
herself eligible for an award and those of his legal dependents Staff
Memorandum 46-47, supra note 27, par V: Rules and Regulations supra
note 60, Rule 10
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ceived will fail to correspond with those needs only in the rare case
where they are less than the statutory minimum award of $50 less
income and resources 78 The considerable increase in the cost of the old
age assistance program as a result of this change in the measurement
of assistance will be offset in part by recent Congressional action which
will increase the federal matching fund contribution to this state from
its present level of approximately $16,000,000 to about $20,000,000
annually,7 but the amount left to be borne locally establishes Wash-
ington as one of the most generous states in the nation in providing for
the welfare and security of its aged citizens 80
While the present plan, as evolved by the department and approved
by the federal board, constitutes a great improvement over previous
plans, much of that improvement has not been carried over into the
statutes, but has been accomplished by disregarding certain provisions
of those statutes Whatever may be their present legal status, as a
practical matter the substance of subdivisions (1), (2) and (4) of Sec-
tion 3(h), 1 excluding the ability of relatives to contribute support 8 2
78 It is not assumed that an applicant's needs, as measured by the de-
partment, would correspond with the estimate which any reader of these
pages would make of his own needs The department's measurement is
necessarily a compromise between what is socially desirable and what
is fiscally possible Washington's "senior citizens" of the twentieth century
have not reached the millennium But they have progressed to a consid-
erable extent beyond the status of the English "senior subject" of the
eleventh century who competed with all other indigents for assistance from
a third of the church tithes
' J M Wedemeyer, supra note 38. This estimate is based on an heroic
computation under Public Law No 719, 79th Cong., 2d Sess, which amended
the existing law providing for maximum federal contributions of $20 per
recipient to provide for contributions in "an amount which shall be
used exclusively as old-age assistance, equal to the sum of the following
proportions of the total amounts expended during such quarter as old-age
assistance under the state plan with respect to each needy individual
who at the time of such expenditure is sixty-five years of age or older and
is not an inmate of a public institution, not counting so much of such
expenditures with respect to any such individual for any month as exceeds
$45-(A) Two-thirds of such expenditures, not counting so much of any
expenditure with respect to any month as exceeds the product of $15
multiplied by the total number of such individuals who receive old-age
assistance for the month, plus (B) One-half of the amount by which such
expenditures exceed the maximum which may be counted under clause
(A) . "
80 Comparative figures for the present time are not yet available As of
July 1, 1945, the average monthly payment in all of the states was $29 40,
with state averages ranging from a low of $1142 in Georgia to a high of
$48.29 in Washington Federal Social Security Board, Annual Report
(1945), p 94; Altmeyer, The First Decade in Social Securitj (1945) 8 Soc
SEC BuL. No 8, at p. 38 After 1945 legislative changes in the states,
the District of Columbia, Hawaii and Alaska, 21 jurisdictions now have no
statutory maximum, 5 have maximums above $40, 20 have a $40 maximum
and 5 have maximums below $40 Berman and Jacobs, Legislative Changes
in Public Assistance (1945), 9 Soc SEC BuL No 4, at p 9
'
1 REM REv STAT (1945 supp) § 9998-36(h)
82 The income of a dependent spouse and of legal dependents (whose
needs are also included in measuring the recipient's needs) is considered




insurance policies with cash surrender values of $500 or less, and other
property worth $200 or less from consideration as resources, is embodied
in the plan, but subdivisions (3), (5) and (6), excluding home owner-
ship, personal effects, foodstuffs and utilities, are disregarded Similarly,
subdivisions (3) and (4) of Section 3 (g), 83 excluding casual gifts and
proceeds from the sale of non-resource property when reinvested in non-
resource property from consideration as income, are substantially in-
cluded in the plan, but subdivisions (1) and (2), excluding the rental
value of the recipient's home, foodstuffs and utilities, are disregarded
These non-operative subdivisions of the statute should certainly be de-
leted, and it may well be doubted whether the other provisions serve
any useful purpose They were designed originally to implement the
general policy of Initiative 141 "to provide for Washington's Senior
Citizens over sixty-five as liberally as is possible under the terms of
the Federal Social Security Act for securing matching funds" Despite
the handicap of a muddled statute which neither the supreme court nor
the legislature seems willing to clarify, the State Department of Social
Security has for five years8" demonstrated a conscientious and persistent
effort to carry out that policy to the fullest extent, and has demonstrated
also that the necessary accommodation of the state program to federal
requirements is better handled by continuous administrative planning
and revision than by biennial legislative action The result of that
demonstration is a compendium 5 of precise definitions of those items
which must be considered and those which may be excluded from con-
sideration in assisting the aged citizen "to meet his needs" "as liberally
as is possible under the terms of the Federal Social Security Act," be-
side which the inadequacy of the statutory definitions is glaringly ob-
vious Hence, it seems desirable that the legislative authority, having
prescribed the liberal policy and fixed the standard of measurement,
should leave the implementation of that policy and the application of
that standard to the department, subject in both respects to judicial
review
Also in need of revision are the provisions of the statute defining the
scope of judicial review The exact status of Section 9 after the Morgan
decision cannot be determined with any certainty, but it is probable that
as therein construed it does not mean what it says And it is certain that,
to comply with federal requirements, those provisions authorizing the
83REM REv STAT (1945 Supp ) § 9998-36(g)
84 On September 3, 1941 the Attorney-General advised the department
that while the then current state plan had been approved by the federal
board, it was the department's duty under Initiative 141 "to submit the
most liberal plan possible to the Federal Social Security Board" and that
the department "should without delay give serious consideration to the
desirability and legal necessity of making further bona fde efforts im-
mediately to liberalize the 'state plan'" O's ArT'Y GEN (1941-1942) p 49
65 Staff Memorandum 46-47, supra note 27, pars II and III; Rules and
Regulations, supra note 60, Rules 10, 11, 12, 25, 27, 30 and 33
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court to receive additional evidence and to fix the amount of the award
cannot be given effect, and should be deleted Considerations of orderly
procedure seem further to require that the court's function in reviewing
the case on the record be more precisely defined That function would
be clarified, and its performance facilitated, by amendment of Section 9
expressly to provide that the only questions subject to review by the
courts are the fairness of the departmental hearing, the presence of evi-
dence in the record to support the department's findings on issues of
fact, and the correctness of the department's rulings on issues of law Il
St The scope of judicial review of administrative decisions is defined in
the proposed Uniform Administrative Procedure Act as follows: "The review
shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the
record, except that in cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the
agency, testimony thereon shall be taken in court The court may affirm re-
verse or modify the decision of the agency The decision shall be reversed or
modified if the court finds that the substantial rights of the appellant have
been prejudiced as a result of the administrative findings, inferences, conclu-
sions or decisions being: (1) contrary to constitutional rights, or privileges;
or (2) in excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency, or
affected by other error of law; or (3) made or promulgated upon unlawful
procedure; or (4) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the
entire record as submitted; or (5) arbitrary or capricious. Upon such re-
view due weight shall be accorded the experience, technical competence,
and specialized knowledge of the agency involved, as well as discretionary
authority conferred upon it" Handbook of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings (1942), p 276.
See also the provision for judicial review in § 10 of the new Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, Public Law No 404, 79th Cong, 2d Sess
1946]
